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Judicial Campaign Financing: An Ever Present Threat to Judicial 
Independence 
 
By: Sarah Jane Morath, Esq. 
 
“Judicial independence doesn’t mean you decide the way you want.  Independence means you decide 
according to the law and the facts.  The law and the facts do not include deciding according to campaign 
contributions.”1 
-Justice Steven Breyer 
 
 
The different processes by which state judges are selected is an increasingly popular topic 
for discussion amongst legal scholars and practitioners. While many law review articles and 
discussions advocate for one method of judicial selection over the other, this article addresses 
one specific and significant concern with the elective method: campaign financing.2  As this 
article explains, campaign financing can impair judicial independence and inhibit fair and 
impartial decisions.  Fortunately, the appointive system is insulated from the pressures and 
problems associated with campaign financing, a benefit which is all the more evident today when 
everyone, including judges, face difficult economic times.  More importantly, however, because 
an appointive system does not involve campaign financing, judicial independence is best 
preserved in states like Maine where state judges are appointed, rather than elected.  
Introduction 
The American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct states: “our legal 
system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret 
and apply the laws that govern us.”3  Judges are required to avoid conduct that appears improper, 
and to perform their duties impartially, without bias or prejudice.4  While all judges strive to 
remain independent and guard against outside influences, judges who are elected to the bench 
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must be even more vigilant.  The reason: these judges must partake in fundraising.  Can a judge 
raise money for his or her campaign and remain an independent arbiter of the facts and law?  The 
public seems to think no.  A 2001 national survey found that 8 of 10 persons believe campaign 
contributions made to judges have a great deal or some influence on a judges’ decision.5  When 
wealthy contributors can sway judicial decisions, judicial independence is in jeopardy.6   
The Different Methods of Judicial Selection 
The debate over which method of judicial selection is best is as old as this country itself.  
During the ratification of the Constitution, the founding fathers discussed the topic extensively.  
Alexander Hamilton believed that, “the complete independence of the courts of justice is 
peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”7  In particular, the debate centered on which 
method, judicial elections or judicial appointments, would better preserve judicial independence.  
Perhaps the most vocal proponent for lifetime judicial appointments, Hamilton argued that 
citizens were maximally protected when judges were free from external influences.  He stated: 
“This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the constitution and 
the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humours which the arts of 
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate 
among the people themselves, and which…have a tendency in the mean time to 
occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the 
minor party in the community. . .”8  
While Hamilton may have been speaking about the federal judiciary, judicial 
independence at the state level was also important.  Regardless of the court, the appointive 
system was the clear preference and all of the original thirteen states adopted such a system for 
their state courts.9  Eight of these states gave the appointive power directly to the legislature, 
while in the other five, governors appointed judges, subject to confirmation by the legislature.10     
 3 
The advent of Andrew Jackson’s presidency saw a shift away from judicial appointments 
towards judicial elections.  Jackson’s populist message was very much at odds with the 
appointive system and judicial accountability quickly overtook its competing interest, judicial 
independence.11  Every state entering the union after 1832 adopted constitutions that provided for 
judicial elections.12  Today 87 percent of state appellate and trial judges are selected through an 
election process.13  Thirty-eight states have some type of judicial elections in their high state 
courts.14   
Merit selection, or the “Missouri Plan,” is a third alternative to the appointive and 
elective systems and combines aspects of both systems.  This method was first adopted by 
Missouri in 194015 and consists of the following: 1). selection of a nonpartisan judicial 
nominating commission; 2). a list of judicial nominees compiled by the commission and 
presented to the appointing authority, usually the governor; and 3). the selection and appointment 
of a nominee.16  After serving an initial term, a judge stands for a “retention election,” an 
uncontested election where a ‘yes’ vote simply allows a judge to continue serving on the bench 
for a full term.17  There are some concerns with this method for its success depends on the 
composition and powers of the nominating commission and judges are still required to stand for 
election at some point.18  Still, twenty states use some form of merit selection in choosing 
judges.19  
The pure appointment of judges is, in this author’s opinion, the best way to maintain a 
truly independent judiciary; yet, only six states employ this method.20  Coincidently, these states, 
Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Virginia, were part of 
the original thirteen colonies.  The appointing power, the legislature or the governor, varies 
amongst these states.  For example, in New Jersey judges are appointed by the governor to serve 
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an initial seven-year term and confirmed by the senate.  Judges can then be appointed for life.21  
While in Virginia, judges are appointed to twelve-year terms through a majority vote of the 
members of each house of its General Assembly.22  Here in Maine, the governor appoints judges 
to a seven-year term.  The appointment is subject to confirmation by a legislative committee 
whose decision can be reviewed by the senate.23  After serving seven years, a judge may be 
reappointed by the governor to another seven-year term.      
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Model Code) serves as a guide for all judges, 
whether appointed or elected.  The Model Code sets forth several canons establishing the 
“standards for ethical conduct of judges.”24  Canon 3 reads, “[a] judge shall perform the duties of 
judicial office impartially and with dignity.”25  As stated in the preamble of the Model Code, 
“when the text uses ‘shall,’ it is intended to impose binding obligations the violation of which 
can result in disciplinary action.”26   Thus, a judge must remain impartial and act with dignity.   
In performing duties impartially and with dignity, a judge must act “without bias or 
prejudice.”27  Commentary 2, further explains Canon 3 by stating that, “a judge must perform 
judicial duties impartially and fairly.  A judge who manifests bias on any basis in a proceeding 
impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute.”28   
While most parties to a lawsuit assume the judge overseeing their case will be impartial, 
few know that this is a requirement.  In Ward v. The Village or Monroeville, 409 U.S. 51 (1972), 
the Supreme Court held that litigants are constitutionally entitled to proceed before a “neutral 
and detached judge.”29  A judge who will interpret and apply the law impartially and fairly is 
what the judicial system madates, and Americans expect.  Selecting judges by an elective 
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process, however, infringes on an independent judiciary.  In particular, the financial aspect of 
judicial elections is making it increasingly more difficult for judges to remain impartial and fair, 
and therefore independent.   
Campaign Financing 
Judicial campaign financing affects judicial independence in several ways.  First, the cost 
of running a judicial campaign is escalating into the millions of dollars.  To be a viable 
contender, judicial candidates must rely on contributions from attorneys and litigants who may 
appear before them.  Second, the expense of a judicial campaign excludes qualified candidates 
and limits the diversity of the bench.  Third, the solicitation of funds by a judge not only gives 
the impression of impropriety, but can also result in impropriety. 
The Million-Dollar Judge 
The amount of money spent on judicial campaigns in recent years is staggering and 
million dollar campaigns now the norm.  In 1994, a successful Michigan Supreme Court 
candidate raised $180,000; in 1998 the winning candidate raised over $1 million.30  The highest 
amount spent in the 1998 North Carolina Supreme Court race was $90,300; in 2001, the amount 
was up to $1,000,000. 31  In 1996, a candidate spent $2.1 million to run for a seat on the Alabama 
Supreme Court; just ten years earlier the campaigning judge raised $237,000.32  These statistics 
show a dramatic increase in campaign spending across the country.   
Because very few judicial candidates have pockets deep enough to run a campaign on 
their wealth alone, most are forced to raise money.  Outside contributions can come from 
lawyers, prospective litigants, or organizations with an economic or political interest in the 
outcome of cases.  A study cited by the ABA, found that 28.1 percent of total contributions to 
state Supreme Court races came from lawyers and undifferentiated lobbyists.33  23.7 percent of 
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the contributions came from interest groups that included general business, real estate and 
insurance, energy and natural resources, construction, health, labor, transportation, agriculture.34  
A separate 2002 study conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice and the National Institute on 
Money in State Politics was able to ascertain the donors of 76 percent of the contributions to 
high court races between 1989 and 2000.  The study revealed that lawyers were responsible for 
29 percent of the contributions, while 19.8 percent came from general business.35  
Similarly, state studies reveal lawyers and businesses as significant sources of campaign 
contributions.  One candidate in Illinois accepted $80,000 from ten personal injury law firms, 
and another $35,000 from a single real estate developer.36  A California study found that in 1995, 
45 percent of the contributions to Los Angeles County Superior Court races came from 
lawyers.37  Because of their obvious interest in the outcome of litigation, it is not surprising that 
attorneys and businesses make large contributions to judicial candidates.  
When contributions are insufficient, many candidates take out personal loans.  6.4 
percent of the total funding for state Supreme Court races came from the candidates 
themselves.38  A study of North Carolina trial court races found that 75 percent of women 
candidates and 67 percent of male candidates reported receiving personal loans from banks, 
family members, or personal finances.39  Given the current state of the economy, one can only 
expect that those judges required to take out loans will increase.       
In states with judicial elections, a little money will always be part of the mix; it is needed 
for advertising, staff salaries, and office expenses.  An effective judicial campaign today, 
however, requires more then just a little money.  A judicial candidate must have a combination 
of the following: independent wealth, the ability to solicit large contributions, and a willingness 
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to assume significant loans.  Candidates who are either unable or unwilling to acquire excessive 
amounts of money for their campaign are severely disadvantaged.  
Exclusion of Qualified Candidates 
Judicial candidates are expected to demonstrate “a competent mastery of the law, good 
moral character, intelligence, impartiality, emotional stability, courtesy, decisiveness, and 
administrative ability.”40  The ability to raise money, which has no relation to these qualities, has 
become an additional “must have” trait of today’s elected judge.  Donors play an important part 
in campaign funding, and those without connections to the wealthy cannot rely on this sector for 
contributions.   
Studies show that those with limited connections to the wealthy are often people of color.  
An ABA Commission Hearing found that “‘ten wealthy and largely white’ [Wisconsin] zip 
codes generated 43.3 percent of all contributions, while ten zip codes ‘where people of color 
comprised the majority’ were responsible for only 1.8 percent.”41  The result is an elected bench 
that is unrepresentative of America’s diverse population.  In fact, elected state judiciaries are less 
diverse then their appointed federal counterparts.42  As of 1997, only 3.8 percent of state court 
judges were African-American, while as of 1999, only 2 percent of state court judges were 
Hispanic.43  
While there are many reasons for the lack of diversity on the bench, wealth is certainly a 
contributing factor.  The ABA summed up the problem when it stated “there is a legitimate cause 
for concern that privately funded campaigns may limit access to judicial office for all candidates, 
of color or otherwise, who derive their support from less affluent communities that are unlikely 
to make significant financial contributions to judicial races.”44  Qualifications, not connections, 
should provide the foundation of a successful judicial campaign.   
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Some judges, while able to solicit the necessary campaign funds, chose not to do so.  
Many feel that it is unethical to accept contributions from individuals and groups that might 
appear before him or her and abstain from doing so.  Concern over the appearance of impropriety 
has caused judges to leave the judicial profession altogether.  For example, former Texas 
Supreme Court Justice Bob Gammage quit after one term because he believed campaigning 
corrupts an independent judiciary.  It was his experience that “[p]eople don’t go pour money into 
contributions because they want fair and impartial treatment…They pump money into campaigns 
because they want things to go their way.”45  If judges believe the election process compromises 
impartial and unbiased results, perhaps this method of selection is not the best.     
The ABA recognizes that “the size of a judicial candidate’s campaign war chest is an 
imperfect indicator of that candidate’s qualification…the war chest, nevertheless exerts an often 
decisive impact on election results.”46  Due to the size of today’s war chest, capable and 
competent candidates cannot run for judicial office or choose not to.  An independent judiciary 
requires more then just wealthy and well-connected judicial candidates. 
Perception of Judges 
 In addition to eliminating qualified judges, campaign financing undermines the public’s 
confidence in the objectivity of the judicial system.   The public perception is that campaign 
contributions sway judges.47  A 2001 national survey conducted by Justice at Stake, a 
nonpartisan campaign focused on keeping courts fair and impartial, found that 76 percent of 
those polled believed that campaign contributions have a great deal or some influence on judicial 
decisions.48  This same organization found that 85% of African American’s polled believe there 
are “two systems of justice--one for the rich and powerful and one for everyone else.”49   
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Surveys conducted by individual states offer similar opinions.  In a Louisiana survey, 56 
percent of voters thought campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions, and only 33 
percent thought that judges for the most part rule impartially.50  Nine out of ten Ohio residents 
believed that campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions.51  A poll conducted in 
Pennsylvania found that nine out of ten voters believed that judicial decisions were influenced by 
large campaign contributions.52  85 percent of the respondents of an Illinois survey agreed that 
campaign contributions influenced the decisions of judges.53  The prevailing public opinion is 
that justice is based on monetary contributions, rather than the law.  
The perception that judges are influenced by contributions exists within the judicial 
profession, as well.  A national survey of state judges conducted by Justice at Stake found that 35 
out of 73 (almost 48 percent) state supreme court judges polled believe that campaign 
contributions have a great deal or some influence on judicial decisions.54   
While most judges are able to remain impartial when supporters come before them, the 
temptation to do otherwise still exists.  One Los Angeles trial judge stated, “it is always in the 
back of my mind who gave me…a large contribution and who didn’t.”55  This judge goes on to 
state that while he tries not to let contributions influence his judgment, “it offers the appearance 
that perhaps judges are for sale.”56  Echoing this sentiment, a Maryland judicial candidate stated, 
“[t]here is a perception that if you contribute money, there’s a payback down the road.”57  When 
the public believes that judges are likely to be influenced by contributions, and judges must make 




An independent judicial system is essential to a healthy state judiciary.  But, judicial 
independence is severely compromised in states where judicial candidates must engage in 
fundraising activities.  As one critic surmised, “judicial independence declines in direct 
proportion to a judge’s dependence on others for financial support and other assistance needed to 
gain and retain the judicial office.”58 
Judicial candidates are left with few options and must solicit funds from individuals and 
groups seeking favors in return and take out loans, or avoid running all together.  The result is a 
bench lacking diversity and a public whose confidence in the judicial system is declining.  
Restoring an independent judiciary in those states, at a minimum, requires a change in the way 
judicial campaigns are currently financed.  
Attempts have been made to curtail the cost of elections through the use of public 
funding and the implementation of fundraising limits.  North Carolina, for example, provides full 
public funding for judicial candidates who accept funding and fundraising limits.59  Texas has 
enacted the Judicial Campaign Fairness Act, limiting campaign contributions from individuals, 
law firms, and political action committies.60  While public funding and contribution limits are 
helpful, the best alternative is the abandonment of the elective system altogether and the 
adoption of an appointive judicial selection process. 
Maine is fortunate to have an appointive system already in place.  An impartial and 
independent judiciary is better maintained and the appearance of impropriety easier to avoid.  
Maine judges are not forced to raise huge sums of money, and they are not distracted by 
campaign contributions.  In addition, this method is immune from changes in the economic 
climate.  Maine citizens can be confident that judicial decisions are made according to the facts 
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and the law, and not the wishes of some large donor.  An independent judiciary in Maine is not 
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